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The Short-Term Impact of Director Transactions of UK Closed-End Funds 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Most closed-end funds are transparent entities that hold securities that are actively traded in 
liquid markets. In such a setting, the argument that director transactions mitigate information 
asymmetry has very limited applicability. Our results provide support for the theory of Barber 
and Odean (2008): retail investor decision-making is influenced by attention-grabbing events. 
Director purchases are one such attention-grabbing event and are associated with significant 
positive price returns - the magnitudes of which are linked to the size of the purchase, the size 
of the fund, and the investment mandate. Trading volumes increase at the time of the 
purchase but most of the initial price responses and trading volumes dissipate over the 
following 15 days.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Most of the empirical literature on the impact of director transactions has, to date, focussed 
on the price response to announcements of director purchases of conventional companies. In 
most cases, that response is positive and is usually attributed to the role of the director 
purchase in mitigating information asymmetry. Directors and managers know more about the 
future prospects of  the firm than outside shareholders and therefore a director purchase 
signals to the outside, less-well-informed shareholders that the firm is undervalued.  
 
This paper examines the price response to director purchases of closed-end funds that they 
oversee. Closed-end funds are transparent entities - the securities held by the fund are known 
as are their market values - and therefore there is much less information asymmetry between 
outside shareholders, the fund managers who manage the fund, and the board of directors. 
Given this transparency and the limited instances of information asymmetry, a director 
transaction should trigger little or no price reaction.  
 
The theory of Barber and Odean (2008) provides the framework for this paper. Buying 
decisions of retail investors, faced with an array of investment opportunities, tend to focus on 
those securities that are the subject of attention-grabbing news. The empirical results suggest 
that director purchases are one such attention-grabbing event. The announcements of director 
purchases of closed-end funds are accompanied by significant positive abnormal price returns 
while there is an insignificant price response to the announcement of director sells. In line 
with previous literature, larger abnormal returns are associated with larger purchases. Larger 
returns are also associated with purchases in those funds that have smaller market 
capitalisations and in those funds that hold assets whose values are uncertain (those investing 
in private equity, venture capital, and hedge funds).   
 
The notion of a hierarchy of information also has limited applicability in the case of closed-
end funds because directors, executive and non-executive, are privy to the same information 
at board meetings. The results bear this out: the price response on the day of purchase is 
similar across executive and non-executives. However, purchases made by a fund¶V chairman 
and executive directors appear to be regarded as more µvaluable¶ by attention-driven investors 
in the weeks immediately after the purchase.        
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The liquidity effects are also in line with attention-grabbing investor behaviour. Trading 
volumes peak around the day of the purchase but revert quickly to pre-purchase levels. As 
expected, an increase in this uninformed trading does not have any impact on bid-ask spreads.    
 
The paper is structured as follows: aspects of the UK closed-end-fund industry are described 
in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the literature relating to director transactions and sets out the 
hypotheses. The sample and the methodology are described in Section 4. The empirical 
results are described in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The UK Closed-End-Fund Industry 
 
Closed-end funds are publicly quoted companies that typically invest in the equity of other 
companies; these other companies are normally also quoted. The market value of the closed-
end-IXQG¶Vassets (the Net Asset Value, NAV) is, in the UK, publically available on a daily 
basis. In most cases, the asset management function is delegated to a fund management firm. 
The fund board comprises a majority of independent members and may include a 
representative of the fund management firm. The board determines the investment mandate 
and receives and reviews reports on the performance of the fund from the manager on a 
regular basis. Details of the mandate and the individual investments held by a fund are 
normally detailed in the annual financial statements while an abbreviated list is usually 
provided in the half-year statement. 
 
Liquidity in the UK closed-end-fund sector has long been an issue. A report commissioned 
by the Association of Investment Companies in 2002 identified the causes for the decline in 
liquidity including a reduction in the level of institutional investor activity, a reluctance of 
market makers to commit capital (funds were at the time quoted on the SEAQ system), and 
private-client fund managers having minimum liquidity thresholds (defined by market 
capitalisation) which led them to exclude some small trusts from their buy lists. Poor liquidity 
was identified as particularly critical for those funds with small market capitalisations.      
 
7KH 8. 0RGHO &RGH VHWV RXW WKH SURYLVLRQV UHODWLQJ WR WKH GLVFORVXUH RI GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV
Directors must inform their company of the transaction as soon as possible and no later than 
the fifth business day after a transaction and the company must inform the London Stock 
Exchange of the transaction no later than the end of the business day following the receipt of 
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the information by the company. The London Stock Exchange disseminates the information 
via its Regulatory News Services. Directors of UK companies are prohibited from trading 
during the two month prior to preliminary, interim, and final earnings announcements but, 
even outside these periods, directors must seek approval to trade from the chairman of the 
board.   
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
3.1 Price reaction 
 
A number of studies investigate the short-term impact of director purchases of conventional 
UK companies (Hillier and Marshall, 2002; Friederich, Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks, 2002; 
and Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog, 2006). The common finding is that director 
purchases are met with positive price returns: Fidrmuc et al.(2006) report abnormal returns at 
day +4 of 1.7% while Dardas and Güttler (2011) report abnormal price returns of 2.5% at day 
+4 and 3.9% at day +20. These positive responses to director purchases are not limited to the 
UK market. Results of similar magnitude are reported by Dardas and Güttler for over 30,000 
director purchases from eight European markets: an average abnormal return of 1.1% at day 
+1 and 2.1% at day +20. Similar price patterns are recorded by Dymke and Walter (2008) 
and Betzer and Theissen (2009).  
 
The existing literature also reports that the larger the director purchase, the more positive the 
price returns. For the UK, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) report abnormal returns of 4.6% for day +4 
for large trades (defined as > 0.1% of the market capitalisation) and 1.1% for small trades. 
These results are of a similar magnitude to those for markets outside the UK (Betzer and 
Theissen, 2009; Dardas and Güttler, 2011). 
 
There are three aspects of information asymmetry that have a relevance to this study:  the 
asymmetry between directors and external shareholders, the asymmetry between the fund and 
the capital market, and the asymmetry between various insiders (executive vs non-executive 
directors). Each of these aspects is discussed below.   
 
With respect to the asymmetry between insiders and external shareholders, Aboody and Lev 
(2000) argue that asymmetry is higher in R&D-intensive firms (and in those firms with 
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uncertain asset values and future prospects) and find that insider purchases in these firms are 
followed by larger price gains. In a similar vein, Dardas and Güttler (2011) find that the price 
effects of purchases are higher in those companies in more R&D-intensive sectors 
(healthcare, energy, and IT). In the closed-end sector, this type of asymmetry is not likely to 
affect the majority of UK closed-end funds ± as noted above, most funds have well defined 
mandates and invest in known and actively-traded securities. However, there are also closed-
end funds with more specialised mandates. Differences in mandate are therefore likely to be 
the source of this type of asymmetry. At one end of the spectrum are funds that hold liquid 
UK-traded quoted securities (a PDQGDWH WR LQYHVW VD\ LQ µ8. *URZWK¶ RU µ8. 6PDOOHU¶
These funds are unlikely to be characterised as having information asymmetries. At the other 
end of the spectrum lie funds investing in private equity, venture capital, and unquoted 
companies where informational asymmetries are likely to exist. In the middle ground lie 
those funds with mandates to invest overseas and hold securities that, although perhaps being 
traded on liquid markets, might be unfamiliar to UK investors.  
 
Regarding the asymmetry between the firm and the capital markets, it is argued that large 
capitalisation firms are followed by more analysts and are subject to more scrutiny with the 
result that informational asymmetry is expected to be smaller. Conversely, smaller firms are 
likely to have higher levels of information asymmetry. A number of studies find supporting 
evidence: announcements of insider purchases in small market-capitalisation firms are 
associated with higher price returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008; 
and Betzer and Theissen, 2009, 2010).  
 
Regarding the informational asymmetries across members of firm boards, the theory of an 
information hierarchy theory asserts that purchases made by senior members, who are 
assumed to have access to superior information, will be associated with higher price returns 
(Seyhun, 1986). However, the empirical results are mixed: Dardas and Güttler (2011) find 
some evidence to support this information hierarchy hypothesis while Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
and Betzer and Theissen (2009, 2010) report inconsistent results. For reasons noted above, 
this type of asymmetry is unlikely to be an issue in the closed-end-fund market.      
 
In a literature unrelated directly to director purchases, research has focussed on the choice of 
securities that investors consider when making an investment decision. Odean (1999) 
suggests that investors limit their choice of stocks in which to invest by focussing only on 
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those stocks that have caught their attention while Barber and Odean (2008) investigate 
whether attention impacts on the buy-decision of retail, rather than institutional, investors. 
They argue that retail LQYHVWRUVIDFHDQRYHUZKHOPLQJFKRLFHLQPDNLQJDµEX\¶GHFLVLRQDQd 
XVHµDWWHQWLRQ¶DVDVFUHHQLQJGHYLFH to select stocks. µ$ttention¶ is, however, not thought to 
affect sell decisions of retail investors as these investors focus their attention only on those 
securities that they already hold. MHDVXUHVRIµDWWHQWLRQ¶LQclude companies publicised in the 
press, companies whose shares have recorded high recent returns/hit a limit price, and 
companies that have experienced high trading volumes (Seasholes and Wu, 2007). Further 
evidence of retail investors investing in those stocks that have caught their attention is 
provided by Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004). Firms subject to attention-grabbing events 
have large buy-sell imbalances and record abnormal price returns that persist, on average, for 
the following two trading weeks (Barber and Odean, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009).  
Barber and Odean (2008) argue that attention-grabbing events affect only the investing 
behaviour of retail investors; because institutional investors are not typically faced with a 
lack of resources to scan for stocks, their investing behaviour is not affected by attention.  
 
The applicability of the Barber and Odean (2008) theory to the UK closed-end fund market 
rests on whether retail investors set the prices of UK closed-end funds. Although 
institutional-investor involvement tends to wax and wane with the average level of the 
closed-end-fund discount, the evidence indicates that prices of UK closed-end funds are set 
by retail investors (Gemmill and Thomas 2002, 2012). In the US, where closed-end funds are 
owned almost exclusively by retail investors, Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998) provide 
supporting evidence for attention-driven trading. They find that in the week following the 
publication in The New York Times of a salient article relating to a specific fund, that IXQG¶V
price reacts much faster to changes in the underlying net asset value. The impact of the price 
response, however, lasts only for two weeks following publication.   
 
3.2 Trading volume and liquidity  
 
The impact of informed trading on market liquidity is not clear. Even in markets where there 
are information asymmetries, the results are mixed. Cheng, Firth, Leung, and Rui (2006) 
report that insider trading leads to wider bid-ask spreads and less depth while Cao, Field, and 
Hanka (2004), in a study at the time of expiry of IPO lock-ups, report an increase in insider 
trading activity but no change in bid-ask spreads.    
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Klibanoff et al. (1997) provide the only evidence on the impact of attention-grabbing events 
on trading volumes. In weeks when fund-specific salient news is published, trading volumes 
of the individual US closed-end funds are 40% higher than average. They interpret this as 
³FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH SUHVHQFH RI XQVRSKLVWLFDWHG LQYHVWRUV ZKRVH ZLOOLQJQHVV WR WUDGH
LQFUHDVHVZLWKQHZV´S        
 
The literature review suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: the announcement of a director purchase will attract the attention of 
retail investors and will be met with positive abnormal price returns. Announcements 
of a director sell will be met with an insignificant price reaction.  
 
Hypothesis 2: the price returns will be positively related to the size of the purchase.  
 
Hypothesis 3: the price returns, after allowing for the size of the purchase, will be 
larger for purchases in small capitalisation funds.  
 
Hypothesis 4: the price response to director purchases in funds that hold assets with 
uncertain values will be higher than the price response to purchases in funds that hold 
liquid and actively-traded assets.  
 
Hypothesis 5: the price response will not depend upon the status of the board member 
making the purchase. Whether attention-grabbing retail investors regard purchases by, 
say, the board chairman, as a more valuable signal is an empirical issue.    
 
Hypothesis 6:  purchases will attract a significant increase in trading volumes in the 
post-purchase period. Given the mixed results in the existing literature, the impact of 
the purchases on liquidity is an empirical issue. Regardless of director purchases, 
smaller capitalisation funds are expected to have wider bid-ask spreads and to have 
larger Amihud illiquidity values (Association of Investment Companies Report, 
2002); whether bid-ask spreads change for larger/smaller director purchases in 
larger/smaller funds is an empirical issue.  
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4. Sample and Methodology 
 
The initial sample comprises 1,979 director purchases and 104 director sells made between 
January 1999 and January 2008. These transactions are made by directors serving on the 
boards of 178 individual funds. Data on the director transactions are obtained from Directors 
Deals while prices, NAVs, bid-ask spreads, and market capitalisations are retrieved from 
Datastream. Data on fund mandates are obtained from the Association of Investment 
Companies website and IURP&D]HQRYH	&R¶V,QYHVWPHQW7UXVW0RQWKO\SXEOLFDWLRQThe 
sample excludes instances where a director opts to receive shares in lieu of fees or subscribes 
a regular amount to a share-savings plan. Table I, Panel A reconciles the initial 1,979 
purchases with the 847 purchases used in the sample; Panel B classifies the purchases and 
sells by month and year. 
 Table I about here 
 
Following Pontiff (1995) and Gemmill and Thomas (2011), abnormal price changes are 
identified by initially running a regression of price returns (dependent variable) against NAV 
returns over a 200 day estimation period (day -250 to -51, where day 0 is the day of the 
transaction).1 Price returns (RP) are computed as ln(P1/P0) where P1 and P0 is the price of the 
fund at day 1 and day 0 respectively. RNAV LVWKHUHWXUQRQWKHIXQG¶VQHW-asset value. Given 
that fund-management expenses are typically a fixed percentage of the NAV, the regression 
is run without a constant.2 A shorter estimation period of 100 days is also used but the results 
are unchanged. In order to allow for the negative price returns when newly-launched funds 
move to trade from a premium to the long-term average level of discount, any purchase that 
takes place in the first 700 days post-IPO is excluded.3 
 
                                                 
1
 This approach is also similar to that used by Klibanoff et al. (1997) who use the NAV as the measure of 
³IXQGDPHQWDOYDOXH´ 
2
 The regressions are re-run with a constant and the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
3
 New closed-end funds are launched at a premium. A premium is defined as (price ± NAV)/NAV. A discount is 
a negative premium. Given a fund price at issue of 100p and launch expenses of (say) 3p, the net assets will be 
97p and the fund sells at a premium of 3.09% at launch. One of the characteristics of the closed-end fund market 
is that, in the aftermarket, funds typically trade at a discount to the NAV. It takes, on average, around 700 
trading days post-IPO for a fund to sell at a level of discount comparable to that of a seasoned fund. During this 
period the price returns of the newly-launched fund will be less than the NAV returns if it is to trade at a similar 
level of discount as seasoned funds (Gemmill and Thomas, 2012).  
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The estimated beta coefficient from the regression is then used to compute the abnormal price 
returns over the period day -50 to +50 (the event period). Abnormal price returns are defined 
as:   
RP - (b RNAV)          (i) 
and cumulated over various intervals in the event period. The robustness of our results is 
tested by running a regression using the Fama-French three factor model over the same 
estimation period as above: 
 
RP  Dȕ1 RM ȕ2 HML ȕ3 SMB İ     (ii) 
where RM is the return on the FTSE All Share Index,  ? is the difference in returns of 
portfolios comprising large and small firms and  ? is the difference in the returns of 
portfolios comprising high and low book-to-market firms. For estimating  ?ǡ the FTSE 
100 index is used as a proxy for the large-firm portfolio and FTSE Small Cap index for the 
small-firm portfolio. For estimating ?, the FTSE 350 Value index is used as a proxy for 
the low market-to-book firm portfolio and FTSE 350 Growth index for the high market-to-
book firm portfolio. As before, the estimated coefficients from the regression over estimation 
period are used to isolate the abnormal price returns in the event window. Some purchases in 
individual funds are clustered leading to a potential bias in the results. When there are two 
purchases of the same fund within a 100 day period, the later purchase is excluded (Betzer 
and Theissen, 2010) 
  
Three measures are used to assess the impact of the purchases on trading volume and 
liquidity: first, following Brav and Gompers (2003), abnormal volume activity is estimated as 
the trading volume around the date of the purchase relative to the fund¶Vpre-announcement 
trading volume: 
 ɘഥ ?ǡ ?ൌ  ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? െ  ?   (iii) 
where Vi,T is the trading volume for fund i on day T. Normal volume is defined as the mean 
daily volume over day -250 to -51 relative to the transaction day. Second$PLKXG¶V
illiquidity measure is estimated as follows: 
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 ? ?ൌ  ? ?݅ݕ   ?ܦ݅ݕݐൌ ?  ห ? ? ? ?ห ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?      (iv) 
where Rt is the price return on day t and Volumet, is the trading volume on day t. The average 
is estimated over all positive-volume days. Third, the bid-ask spread, defined as the 
difference between the bid and ask price divided by the average of the bid and ask price. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Price effects 
The abnormal returns for periods surrounding the date of the transactions using (i) above are 
shown in Table II, Panel A. For the 847 purchases, the pre-transaction period (day -50 to -2) 
is characterized by insignificant returns; over this period the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) total an insignificant 0.56%. The returns are cumulated over various post-transaction 
periods and start at day -1 to allow for the possibility that the details of the purchase were 
known on the day before the published date of the transaction. On day 0, the average return 
of 0.25% is significant (t = 5.06) and continues to accumulate over the following 50 days. 
Over the period day -1 to +50, the price returns total 1.55% (0.38% + 1.17%). Considering all 
purchases, there is no evidence that this price effect dissipates over time but this issue is 
revisited when the results are categorized by size of purchase.  
 
Table II about here 
 
In contrast to the purchases, the 104 sell trades are preceded by a significant price run-up of 
around 3.48% in the period day -50 to -2. The sale transaction itself does not generate any 
price reaction; the abnormal return over day -1 to +1 averages an insignificant 0.32%. This 
finding provides support for the theory of Barber and Odean (2008). Only the publication of 
director purchases appears to attract attention-driven trading. A plot of the average daily price 
returns and abnormal returns for purchases cumulated over a 50 day period preceding and 
following the date of the transaction is shown in Figure 1.  
 
The returns using (ii) above are shown in Table II, Panel B. The returns, for both the 
purchases and sells, are similar. For example, the returns for purchases when cumulated over 
day +2 to +50, the difference amounts to only to 0.08% (1.25% - 1.17%). Given the fact that 
the number of sells is relatively small and that the results of the purchases are much stronger 
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than those for the sells, the rest of the analysis focusses only on purchases using (i) above to 
isolate the abnormal returns.4   
 
It could, of course, be that the abnormal returns are driven by factors such as reversion of the 
discount. &KHQJ &RSHODQG DQG 2¶+DQORQ (1994), for example, find that portfolios 
comprising funds selling at larger discounts record higher subsequent abnormal returns than 
those comprising funds selling at narrower discounts while Copeland (2007) finds that 
discount reversion is faster when a fund trades at the arbitrage bounds. In order to confirm 
that the abnormal returns are attributable to the impact of director purchases rather than 
discount reversion, the purchases are split equally between those made when the individual 
fund discount on the day of purchase is KLJKORZUHODWLYHWRWKDWIXQG¶VDYHUDJHGLVFRXQW over 
the 250 days prior to day -50. The results are shown in Table II, Panel C. In all cases the 
CARs for the narrow relative discount group are larger than those for the wider relative 
discount group and thus give no support for the notion that the CARs following director 
purchases might be driven by discount reversion.  
 
Two further tests are carried out to establish that the CARs are attributable to the impact of 
the director purchases. The first test matches the director purchases with notional purchases 
by level of discount. Thus, if a director purchase in a particular fund is made when the level 
of discount is, say, 14%, a national purchase is made in the same fund when the fund again 
trades at a discount of 14% (but outside the estimation and event period for the director 
purchase). The second test matches director purchases with notional purchases by the 
magnitude of the purchase. Although it is not possible to match precisely the trading volumes 
on director-purchase days with those on no-director-purchase days, it is possible to identify 
those days where the sole transaction in a particular fund is a non-director purchase of 
between £20,000 and £50,000 (the average size of a director purchase is around £20,000). 
Having established the dates of the notional purchases, abnormal returns are computed as 
described above. For both tests, the CARs for these notional purchases over days -1 to +15 
are negative and insignificant (-0.06% for the first test and -0.02% for the second test). 
Although it is not possible to associate the abnormal returns unambiguously with the director 
purchases, the empirical evidence does point to the CARs in Table II, Panel A being driven 
by such purchases. 
                                                 
4
 In the tables that follow, abnormal returns have been computed using regression (i). The results using 
regression (ii) are similar but are not reported here.  
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The question then arises of whether these abnormal returns are exploitable. Although average 
CARs over day -1 to +50 total 1.55%, a strategy of buying the fund and selling the NAV 
benchmark (and subsequently closing out both positions) would incur two sets of round-trip 
transactions costs totalling around 2.4% (including 0.5% stamp duty and estimated 
commission of 0.1%) - and that assumes that the NAV can be cheaply and efficiently 
replicated. It is therefore unlikely that these short-term abnormal returns could be profitably 
exploited.5            
 
Following the conventional insider-trader literature, the CARs are classified below by 
magnitude of purchase, fund size, investment mandate, and identity of purchaser. The results 
for the purchases categorized by size of the purchase are shown in Table III, Panel A. For the 
151 smallest purchases (<£5,000), none of the post-transaction returns are significant while 
the only significant return (of 0.17%) is recorded on day 0 for the 173 purchases between 
£5,000 and £10,000. For purchases above £10,000 the results are in line with the literature 
using conventional companies. Larger purchases are broadly accompanied by larger post-
transaction returns. For the other four groupings (reflecting progressively larger average 
purchases) the returns cumulated over day -1 to +50 are 1.96% (0.57% + 1.39%), 1.34%, 
2.50%, and 3.56% respectively.       
 
Table III about here 
 
However, for three of these four groupings, the price impact dissipates over the 15 days 
following the transaction. This is similar to the findings reported by Barber et al. (2009). 
Apart from the 77 largest purchases (> £100,000) none of the returns in the £10,000 to 
£100,000 bands are significant when cumulated over day +16 to +50.   
 
Table III, Panel B shows the returns categorised by the purchases each weighted by the 
market-values of the funds in which the purchases were made. The pattern of the returns is 
not as clearly defined as in Panel A. Only the group of 298 purchases (with a value of 
purchase/market value falling in the range 0.01% to 0.05%) has a similar pattern to the un-
                                                 
5
 In Table V, CARs of over 6% at day +50 are recorded following large purchases in funds holding illiquid 
assets (such as venture capital and private equity). It is, however, very unlikely that short positions in the NAV 
for such funds could be constructed.      
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weighted purchases - significantly positive and increasing returns up to day +15 but then 
reducing and insignificant over day +16 to +50. One explanation for these results for the 
market-capitalisation-weighted purchases is that the Regulatory News Service and other data 
providers typically disclose the absolute amount of the transaction and do not relate the size 
of the purchase to the market value of the fund. The pattern of the returns and their relation to 
the categorisations suggest that attention-driven investors are influenced more by the absolute 
size of the transaction than by the weighted data.                
  
Table IV, Panel B shows the impact of the purchases classified by the market capitalisation of 
the fund. Simply analyzing the purchases by the market capitalisation might be misleading if 
larger purchases were made in larger-capitalisation funds. The funds are therefore first 
categorised into 6 market-capitalisation groups, ranging from £50m to those with a market 
capitalisation of more than £1bn. Only in the case of the 30 purchases in funds that have a 
market capitalisation of between £700m and £1bn is the average value of the purchases 
(£52,650) significantly different from the average value of purchases in the other groupings. 
Panel A gives the price reactions classified by the market capitalisation. Purchases in the two 
smaller market capitalisation categories (up to £100m) are associated with higher returns and 
cumulate over day -1 to +50, to 3.78% and 2.12%. In contrast, none of the purchases in the 
three largest groupings are associated with significant returns. Although the average 
purchases are similar across most funds of different market capitalisations, purchases in 
smaller capitalised funds clearly generate higher positive returns. The results support the 
findings of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and the notion that purchases in small market-
capitalisation funds attract the particular notice of attention-driven investors.  
 
Table IV about here 
 
Table V shows the returns classified according to the likely information asymmetry in the 
investment mandates. Group A funds are those that invest in liquid, actively-traded UK 
securities, Group B funds are those that invest in quoted securities actively traded on liquid 
overseas markets, and Group C funds are those investing in hedge funds, private equity, and 
venture-capital firms. For each group, the purchases are categorized into high- and low-value. 
Low- (high-) value purchases are defined as those with a market-weighted value lower 
(higher) than the average market-weighted value of all the purchases in that Group.  
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Table V about here 
 
The average return for all purchases in Group A and B, cumulated over day -1 to +50, are 
similar: 1.13% (0.08% + 1.05%) and 1.21% respectively; while the returns for the same time 
interval for Group C are much higher at 3.49%. These results are in line with the hypothesis 
that purchases in funds with the highest asymmetry will have the greatest price impact. As in 
the results in Table III, it is also clear that the magnitude of the purchases within each group 
also has an effect on returns although the difference is, in most cases, statistically 
insignificant. Within Group A, low-market-value-weighted purchases generate abnormal 
returns of 0.77% over day -1 to +50 while the high-value purchases generate 3.05%. The 
corresponding figures are almost identical for Group B purchases (0.73% and 3.64%). Group 
C figures are much higher at 2.88% for small-value purchases and 7.42% the high-value 
purchases. However, the results for Group C have to be treated with caution given that there 
are only 126 purchases, of which only 17 are high-value. In most cases, the price impact 
dissipates in the day +2 to +15 interval. The results suggest that director purchases do 
mitigate information asymmetries about the value of assets held by the fund but the size of 
the purchase still appears to be an important signal across all three groups.         
 
Returns categorised by the status of the director are shown in Table VI. The first three rows 
show the returns classified by executive and non-executive. The abnormal return on day 0 is 
broadly similar across all three categories although purchases by former executive directors 
are more highly valued over subsequent weeks. A similar pattern is seen in rows four and five 
where purchases by chairmen generate an accumulated abnormal return of around one 
percent by day +50 compared to purchases made by other members of the board. 
 
Table VI about here 
 
5.2 Liquidity effects 
 
The results for the three liquidity measures are set out in Table VII and plotted in Figure II. 
As expected, abnormal trading volume increases significantly around the day of the 
transaction and in the couple of days following but then falls back, within 15 trading days, to 
pre-transaction levels.  
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Table VII and Figure II about here 
 
Averaged over the 706 observations, the Amihud illiquidity measure increases from a value6 
of 0.12 over day -15 to -2 to 0.14 on day 0 suggesting that, on average, funds become more 
illiquid. The illiquidity measure is also shown for small/large funds (those with a market 
value less/more than the average market value of all funds) and then by the size of purchase.7    
 
The Amihud measure for large- and small-capitalisation funds illustrates vividly this lack of 
liquidity. Even before the purchase, the measure for the small funds is about twice that for 
large funds and this difference is highly significant for all time intervals. First, for the 400 
small purchases in the small funds group, the illiquidity worsens significantly on day 0. The 
measure on day 0 of 0.18 is significantly different from both the measure of 0.14 over day -
15 to -2 (t-stat = 3.8) and the measure of 0.13 over day +2 to +15 (t-stat = 4.0). The impact of 
the purchase on illiquidity is very short-lived:  there is no difference in the measure over the 
14 days preceding and following day 0. Paradoxically, for the 90 large purchases in the small 
funds group, there is no significant difference in the Amihud measure for any of the intervals 
surrounding day 0.  
 
In the group of large funds, liquidity on day 0 improves for both small and large purchases. 
The measure on day 0 of 0.06 for small purchases is significantly different from the measure 
of 0.07 over day -15 to -2 (t-stat = 3.3) while the corresponding measures for large purchases 
(0.03 and 0.06) are also significantly different (t-stat = 2.1). There is, however, no significant 
difference in the measure for small and large purchases over the 14 days preceding and 
following day 0. The impact of the purchase on liquidity is again short-lived. 
 
The pre-transaction-date bid-ask spreads confirm the expected differences in liquidity. The 
spreads of the small funds are around twice of those of the large funds. The differences are 
highly significant: the t-stat for the 1.3% difference in the spread between small and large 
funds (measured over day -15 to -2) is 12.1. However, none of the differences in the spread 
for small funds and small/large purchases are significant across the various time intervals. 
Similarly, none of the differences in the spread for large funds and small/large purchases are 
significant across the various time intervals. This is in line with results of Greene and Smart 
                                                 
6
 1RWHWKDWWKHUHSRUWHGILJXUHVIRU$PLKXG¶VLOOLTXLGLW\PHDVXUHDUHPXOWLSOLHGE\3. 
7
 Small/large purchases are those purchases which have a value less/more than the average value of all the 
purchases in the small (or large) fund group 
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(1999) that indicate that an increase in (uninformed) retail trading does not increase bid-ask 
spreads.  
 
Although the results are mixed (liquidity worsens for small funds and improves for large 
funds) most of the evidence points to the investing activity of retail, attention-driven 
investors: trading volumes increase significantly on the day of the transaction but the changes 
in trading volume and Amihud measures of illiquidity are all very shorted-lived and revert 
back to pre-transaction levels within 15 days.      
 
6. Summary 
Most of the empirical work to date has examined the impact of director purchases in 
conventional companies with the assumption that such purchases help alleviate information 
asymmetry. The positive price reactions recorded by previous studies are assumed to result 
from the directors knowing more about the prospects of the company than outsider 
shareholders. This study examines the impact of director purchases in closed-end funds, the 
majority of which are simple and transparent entities where information asymmetry is not an 
issue. Despite this, director purchases are accompanied by significant positive price returns. 
This price reaction is attributed to the activities of retail, attention-driven investors. The 
results provide support for the theory of Barber and Odean (2008) and Barber et al. (2009). In 
line with their theory, director sells are not associated with abnormal price returns around the 
date of the transaction. Most of the empirical results are similar to those examining director 
purchases in conventional companies: the magnitude of the price reaction is positively related 
to the size of the purchase; purchases in smaller funds are associated with higher price 
returns; and a more positive return for purchases in those funds that hold assets which are 
likely to have higher informational asymmetries. In most cases the price impact begins to 
dissipate 15 days following the purchase, a result that is broadly similar to those reported by 
Barber et al. (2009). 
 
Although the average director purchase and abnormal price return is modest in this sample 
compared to the existing insider-trader literature using conventional companies, it does raise 
the question of what part of the returns reported in the conventional-company literature is 
attributable to the activities of attention-driven investors and what part attributable to the 
resolution of information asymmetry.   
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Table I:  
 
Panel A 
 
All director-purchase transactions (January 1999 to January 2008) 1,979 
Less: more than 30 days between transaction date and the documented announcement date  (39) 
 1,940 
Less: purchases within 900 days following an IPO (102) 
 1,838 
Less: multiple purchases on same day (159) 
 1,679 
Less: transactions with overlapping pre- and post-purchase event periods (832) 
 847 
 
Panel B 
The number of director purchases by month and year 
  
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 1999 6 8 9 6 7 10 3 3 8 4 6 6 76 
2000 4 9 6 4 10 9 6 4 10 6 5 4 77 
2001 4 5 6 4 6 4 5 2 10 5 5 0 56 
2002 0 9 17 9 9 3 15 10 9 5 7 5 98 
2003 9 6 16 17 3 13 10 7 8 12 9 0 110 
2004 10 6 17 9 10 10 10 5 7 8 6 10 108 
2005 3 9 7 3 10 10 9 7 6 7 8 12 91 
2006 9 5 14 5 6 10 8 4 9 9 11 6 96 
2007 8 11 13 8 10 10 9 11 10 8 10 12 120 
2008 15 
           
15 
 
68 68 105 65 71 79 75 53 77 64 67 55 847 
 
The number of director sells by month and year 
 
  
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 1999 5 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 14 
2000 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 8 
2001 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 8 
2002 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 11 
2003 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 6 
2004 1 0 3 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 12 
2005 1 2 3 2 0 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 15 
2006 1 1 5 1 4 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 18 
2007 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 11 
2008 1 
           
1 
 
13 7 22 11 8 8 2 3 11 9 8 2 104 
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Panel A reconciles the total number of purchases (1,979) made by directors with the number 
of purchases used in the sample (847). Panel B categorises the purchases and sells by month 
and year 
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Table II  
 
Panel A 
 
 
 Obs CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
 
-50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
   
 
    
 
 Purchases 847 -0.564% -0.326% -0.238% 0.383% 0.245% 0.497% 0.675% 1.172% 
  
(-1.67) (-1.14) (-1.31) (4.57) (5.06) (2.75) (1.99) (4.10) 
   
 
    
 
 Sells 104 3.484% 2.194% 1.290% -0.321% -0.125% 0.303% 0.318% 0.621% 
    (5.06) (3.77) (3.50) (-1.88) (-1.27) (0.82) (0.46) (1.07) 
 
Panel B 
 
 Obs CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
 -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
          
Purchases 847 -0.202% -0.063% -0.138% 0.391% 0.232% 0.493% 0.760% 1.252% 
  (-0.62) (-0.23) (-0.80) (4.88) (5.02) (2.85) (2.35) (4.58) 
          
Sells 104 2.766% 1.876% 0.891% -0.204% -0.135% 0.427% 0.647% 1.073% 
  (4.38) (3.52) (2.64) (-1.31) (-1.50) (1.26) (1.03) (2.01) 
 
Panel C 
 
 Obs CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
Narrow relative discount 423 
 
0.561% 
(1.08) 
0.460% 
(2.14) 
0.626% 
(0.46) 
0.774% 
(0.26) 
1.400% 
(0.48) 
Wide relative discount 424 
 
0.206% 
(1.30) 
0.032% 
(2.63) 
0.368% 
(0.54) 
0.570% 
(0.29) 
0.938% 
(0.55) 
 
The tables above show the cumulative abnormal price returns (CARs) over various event periods surrounding 
the day of the director transaction (day 0). t-stats are shown in parentheses. 
 
In Panel A, the abnormal price returns are computed by regressing the price returns against the net-asset-value 
returns (the independent variable) over the estimation period (day -450 to day -200) and using the coefficients 
from that regression to compute the abnormal returns for the event period.  
 
In Panel B, instead of the net-asset-value returns, the independent variables comprise the return on the FTSE All 
Share Index, the return on a portfolio comprising the difference in returns of large and small capitalisation firms 
(SMB), and the return of a portfolio comprising the difference in returns of high and low book-to-market firms 
(HML). In estimating SMBǡ the FTSE 100 index is used as a proxy for the large-firm portfolio and FTSE Small 
Cap index for the small-firm portfolio. In estimating HML, the FTSE 350 Value index is used as a proxy for the 
low market-to-book firms and FTSE 350 Growth index for the high market-to-book firms. 
 
Panel C show the CARs for the director purchases split equally by the level of discount on the date of purchase 
relative to the average level of discount of that fund measured over days -300 to -51.   
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Table III 
 
Panel A 
 
  
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
 
  
 
     
 
   151 -1.084% -0.944% -0.139% 0.172% 0.105% -0.368% 0.899% 0.531% 
  
(-1.48) (-1.53) (-0.36) (0.95) (1.01) (-0.94) (1.23) (0.86) 
   
 
     
 
   £5,001 to £10,000 173 -0.934% -1.085% 0.151% 0.159% 0.174% -0.012% 0.627% 0.615% 
  
(-1.83) (-2.52) (0.56) (1.26) (2.39) (-0.05) (1.23) (1.43) 
   
 
     
 
 £10,001 to £20,000 192 -0.283% 0.340% -0.623% 0.571% 0.236% 0.739% 0.646% 1.385% 
  
(-0.41) (0.59) (-1.69) (3.35) (2.40) (2.01) (0.94) (2.38) 
   
 
     
 
 £20,001 to £50,000 175 -0.672% -0.692% 0.020% 0.330% 0.301% 0.856% 0.152% 1.009% 
  
(-1.05) (-1.28) (0.06) (2.08) (3.29) (2.50) (0.24) (1.87) 
   
 
     
 
 £50,001 to £100,000 76 -0.206% 0.796% -1.001% 0.811% 0.483% 1.234% 0.452% 1.687% 
  
(-0.22) (1.01) (-2.02) (3.53) (3.64) (2.48) (0.49) (2.15) 
   
 
     
 
    >£100,000 77 0.468% 0.661% -0.193% 0.559% 0.341% 1.220% 1.778% 2.998% 
    (0.62) (1.04) (-0.48) (3.00) (3.17) (3.03) (2.36) (4.71) 
 
Panel B 
 
 
 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
 
 
  
     
 
 0.0025% 147 0.327% 0.096% 0.231% -0.185% -0.025% -0.455% -0.106% -0.561% 
  
(0.49) (0.17) (0.64) (-1.11) (-0.26) (-1.27) (-0.16) (-0.99) 
  
  
     
 
0.0025% - 0.0050% 88 -0.235% -0.317% 0.082% 0.188% 0.091% 0.443% 0.538% 0.980% 
  
(-0.33) (-0.53) (0.22) (1.06) (0.89) (1.16) (0.75) (1.63) 
  
  
     
 
0.0050% - 0.0075% 86 -0.565% -0.937% 0.373% 0.177% 0.246% -0.224% 1.545% 1.321% 
  
(-0.77) (-1.51) (0.95) (0.97) (2.34) (-0.57) (2.10) (2.12) 
  
  
     
 
0.0075% - 0.0100% 42 0.025% 0.217% -0.192% 0.064% -0.004% -0.013% -1.242% -1.255% 
  
(0.03) (0.27) (-0.38) (0.27) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-1.30) (-1.55) 
  
  
     
 
0.01% - 0.05% 298 -1.275% -0.662% -0.613% 0.458% 0.254% 0.645% 0.473% 1.119% 
  
(-2.54) (-1.56) (-2.29) (3.69) (3.55) (2.41) (0.94) (2.64) 
  
  
     
 
> 0.05% 174 -0.113% 0.135% -0.248% 1.047% 0.590% 1.509% 1.679% 3.188% 
 
  (-0.14) (0.19) (-0.56) (5.12) (5.00) (3.42) (2.03) (4.57) 
 
Panel A shows the cumulated price returns classified by the magnitude of the director purchase. Panel B shows 
the abnormal price returns classified by the purchase weighted by the market value of the fund in which the 
purchase is made.  
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  Table IV 
 
Panel A 
 
  
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
Market value of fund Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
  
 
      
 
            P 194 -1.563% -1.126% -0.437% 0.856% 0.386% 1.036% 1.886% 2.922% 
  
(-1.92) (-1.63) (-1.00) (4.24) (3.31) (2.38) (2.31) (4.24) 
  
 
      
 
      £50m to £100m 171 -1.004% -0.668% -0.336% 0.623% 0.362% 0.546% 0.954% 1.500% 
  
(-1.71) (-1.35) (-1.07) (4.28) (4.32) (1.74) (1.62) (3.02) 
  
 
      
 
    £100m to £300m 244 -0.346% -0.132% -0.214% 0.286% 0.256% 0.410% -0.055% 0.356% 
  
(-0.75) (-0.34) (-0.86) (2.49) (3.87) (1.66) (-0.12) (0.91) 
  
 
      
 
    £300m to £700m 137 0.936% 0.614% 0.322% -0.049% 0.040% 0.231% -0.078% 0.152% 
  
(1.62) (1.26) (1.04) (-0.34) (0.49) (0.75) (-0.14) (0.31) 
  
 
      
 
  £700m to £1,000m 30 -0.040% 0.345% -0.385% -0.166% -0.098% -0.623% 0.840% 0.217% 
  
(-0.03) (0.31) (-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.87) (0.63) (0.19) 
  
 
      
 
        > £1,000m 59 0.214% 0.194% 0.019% -0.079% 0.029% -0.007% 0.265% 0.258% 
    (0.28) (0.30) (0.05) (-0.41) (0.26) (-0.02) (0.34) (0.39) 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Size of Fund Average Purchase  (£) 
 
Differences in Purchases (£)  (p-values) 
            P 22,900 1     
      £50m to £100m 23,900  (0.67) 1    
    £100m to £300m 25,350  (0.28) (0.54) 1   
    £300m to £700m 24,100  (0.63) (0.94) (0.61) 1  
  £700m to £1,000m 52,650  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 1 
         > £1,000m 26,050  (0.40) (0.58) (0.86) (0.63) (0.01) 
 
Panel A shows the cumulated price returns of the director purchases classified by the market value of the fund in 
which the purchase is made. t-stats are shown in parentheses.  
 
Panel B shows the average director purchases (£) in funds classified by their market values. Columns 3 to 7 
(Differences in Purchases) shows the p-values testing for differences in the magnitude of the director purchases 
across fund sizes. 
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Table V 
 
  
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
Group A 
 
 
      
 
  
 
      
 
All 280 -0.555% -0.367% -0.188% 0.083% 0.068% 0.538% 0.511% 1.049% 
  
(-1.30) (-1.02) (-0.82) (0.79) (1.11) (2.35) (1.20) (2.90) 
  
 
      
 
Small purchases 225 -0.811% -0.432% -0.379% -0.040% 0.042% 0.499% 0.313% 0.812% 
  
(-1.87) (-1.18) (-1.63) (-0.37) (0.60) (2.15) (0.72) (2.22) 
  
 
      
 
Large purchases 55 -0.440% -0.336% -0.104% 0.542% 0.226% 0.827% 1.685% 2.511% 
  
(-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.19) (2.16) (1.56) (1.53) (1.66) (2.93) 
  
 
      
 
t-stat (small - large) 
 
(-0.31) (-0.10) (-0.49) (-1.69) (-1.03) (-0.63) (-1.33) (-1.60) 
  
 
      
 
Group B 
 
 
      
 
  
 
      
 
All 441 -0.281% -0.168% -0.113% 0.361% 0.235% 0.291% 0.562% 0.853% 
  
(-0.67) (0.48) (-0.50) (3.50) (3.94) (1.30) (1.35) (2.42) 
  
 
      
 
Small purchases 368 -0.369% -0.293% -0.076% 0.171% 0.134% 0.024% 0.539% 0.563% 
  
(-0.92) (-0.86) (-0.36) (1.72) (2.34) (0.11) (1.34) (1.65) 
  
 
      
 
Large purchases 73 0.166% 0.460% -0.295% 1.319% 0.742% 1.636% 0.682% 2.320% 
  
(0.14) (0.47) (-0.48) (4.64) (4.52) (2.66) (0.59) (2.39) 
  
 
      
 
t-stat (small - large) 
 
(-0.42) (-0.70) (0.28) (-2.16) (-1.90) (-2.25) (-0.14) (-1.36) 
  
 
      
 
Group C 
 
 
      
 
  
 
      
 
All 126 -1.168% -0.686% -0.482% 1.145% 0.650% 1.070% 1.274% 2.344% 
  
(-1.27) (-0.88) (-.98) (5.03) (4.95) (2.18) (1.39) (3.02) 
  
 
      
 
Small purchases 109 -0.808% -0.387% -0.421% 1.205% 0.672% 0.769% 0.903% 1.672% 
  
(-0.84) (-0.48) (-0.82) (5.07) (4.89) (1.50) (0.94) (2.06) 
  
 
      
 
Large purchases 17 -3.480% -2.609% -0.871% 0.766% 0.512% 2.996% 3.656% 6.652% 
  
(-2.02) (-1.80) (-0.95) (1.80) (2.08) (3.26) (2.13) (4.58) 
  
 
      
 
t-stat (small - large) 
 
(0.99) (0.91) (0.45) (1.01) (0.48) (-2.47) (-1.46) (-2.50) 
 
The table shows the cumulated price returns of director purchases in funds classified by the investment mandate. 
t-stats are shown in parentheses. Group A comprises those funds which invest in liquid, actively traded UK 
securities; Group B comprises those funds which invest in actively traded securities in other liquid markets 
globally; Group C comprises those funds which invest in securities which have uncertain values such as hedge 
funds, private equity, and venture capital. 
 
The returns are further classified by purchases that are weighted by market value. Large purchases are those that 
are have a market-weighted-purchase value bigger than the average market-weighted-purchase value for all 
purchases in that Group.         
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Table VI 
 
  
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 
 
Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
  
 
      
 
Executive 52 -0.170% 0.145% -0.315% 0.261% 0.202% 1.286% 0.272% 1.558% 
  
(-0.18) (0.18) (-0.62) (1.11) (1.49) (2.54) (0.29) (1.94) 
  
 
      
 
Non-Executive 624 -0.524% -0.238% -0.286% 0.454% 0.253% 0.427% 0.454% 0.881% 
  
(-1.41) (-0.76) (-1.44) (4.93) (4.75) (2.15) (1.22) (2.80) 
  
 
      
 
Former Executive 168 -0.872% -0.799% -0.073% 0.177% 0.229% 0.522% 1.626% 2.149% 
  
(-1.36) (-1.47) (-0.21) (1.12) (2.50) (1.52) (2.54) (3.96) 
  
 
      
 
  
 
      
 
Chairman  126 -0.615% -0.328% -0.288% 0.211% 0.125% 0.942% 1.213% 2.155% 
  
(-0.96) (-0.60) (-0.84) (1.32) (1.36) (2.74) (1.88) (3.96) 
  
 
      
 
Non-Chairman 721 -0.555% -0.326% -0.229% 0.413% 0.266% 0.419% 0.581% 1.000% 
    (-1.51) (-1.05) (-1.17) (4.55) (5.07) (2.14) (1.58) (3.23) 
 
The table shows the price returns classified by the position held by the director making the purchase. t-stats are 
shown in parentheses. 
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Table VII 
 
 
Obs -50, -2 -50, -16 -15, -2 -1, +1 0 +2, +15 +16, +50 +2, +50 
  
 
      
 
Abnormal trading volume 699 -4.29% -4.60% -3.60% 10.98% 15.13% -2.07% -4.89% -4.07% 
  
 
      
 
$PLKXG¶VLOOLTXLGLW\ (103) 706 0.110 0.110 0.116 0.119 0.136 0.114 0.115 0.113 
  
 
      
 
Small funds 490 0.129 0.129 0.137 0.143 0.178 0.134 0.131 0.131 
Large funds 216 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.069 0.059 0.071 0.078 0.076 
t-stat (small - large funds)  
 
(11.38) (11.19) (10.58) (8.64) (9.28) (10.61) (9.35) (10.16) 
  
 
      
 
Small funds / small purchases 400 0.126 0.126 0.132 0.146 0.187 0.130 0.128 0.127 
                    /  large purchases 90 0.145 0.142 0.157 0.132 0.147 0.150 0.144 0.144 
t-stat (small - large purchases) 
 
(-2.32) (-1.86) (-2.25) (0.95) (1.68) (-1.86) (-1.85) (-2.07) 
  
 
      
 
Large funds / small purchases 180 0.070 0.069 0.073 0.070 0.063 0.074 0.079 0.077 
                    / large purchases 36 0.071 0.074 0.065 0.061 0.033 0.057 0.074 0.069 
t-stat (small - large purchases) 
 
(-.09) (-0.39) (0.56) (0.63) (3.32) (1.65) (0.36) (0.60) 
  
 
      
 
Bid-ask spread 838 2.15% 2.14% 2.16% 2.11% 2.12% 2.18% 2.16% 2.17% 
 
 
 
      
 
Small funds 597 2.51% 2.50% 2.52% 2.46% 2.45% 2.55% 2.54% 2.54% 
Large funds 241 1.23% 1.22% 1.23% 1.22% 1.27% 1.24% 1.17% 1.19% 
t-stat (small - large funds) 
 
(12.48) (12.39) (12.12) (10.86) (8.58) (11.26) (12.73) (12.54) 
  
 
      
 
Small funds / small purchases 490 2.52% 2.52% 2.53% 2.46% 2.44% 2.57% 2.56% 2.56% 
                    /  large purchases 107 2.46% 2.44% 2.51% 2.47% 2.51% 2.45% 2.44% 2.44% 
t-stat (small - large purchases) 
 
(0.30) (0.37) (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.32) (0.58) (0.59) (0.30) 
  
 
      
 
Large funds / small purchases 202 1.21% 1.21% 1.21% 1.18% 1.26% 1.23% 1.16% 1.18% 
                    / large purchases 39 1.32% 1.30% 1.38% 1.46% 1.35% 1.30% 1.24% 1.26% 
t-stat (small - large purchases) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.68) (-1.14) (-1.20) (-0.27) (-0.38) (-0.61) (-0.62) 
 
The table shows various measures of liquidity for intervals around the date of the director purchase.  
 
The abnormal trading volume is computed as the percentage change in the average daily trading volume 
recorded over the various intervals above over the average trading volume measured over day -250 to -51.  
 
$PLKXG¶VLOOLTXLGLW\LVVKRZQDVDGDLO\PHDVXUH and computed for 706 transactions averaged over the interval 
noted (x 1000). The liquidity measure is also shown for small/large funds (those with a market value less/more 
than the average market value of all funds) and then by the size of purchase (small/large purchases are those 
purchases which have a value less/more than the average purchase value in that group).    
 
The bid-ask spread is computed for the 838 transactions and averaged over the number of days in the interval 
noted. 7KH FDWHJRULVDWLRQ EHWZHHQ ODUJHVPDOO IXQGV DQG SXUFKDVHV LV LGHQWLFDO WR WKDW XVHG IRU $PLKXG¶V
illiquidity measure.        
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Figure I 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal price returns (the solid line) over the period day -50 to +50 around 
the date of the transaction and the daily average price returns (the dotted line) over the same period.   
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Figure II 
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The three panels show the measures over the 50 days preceding and following the day of the transaction.  
 
The abnormal volume is computed as the percentage change in the average volume in the period day -50 to +50 
around the date of the director purchase over the volume averaged across all funds in the period day -250 to -51.     
 
%RWK$PLKXG¶VLOOLTXLGLW\PHDVXUH and the bid-ask spread are measured averaged across all funds for each of the 
days -50 to +50 around the date of the director purchase.  
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